Nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy Todd S Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann
Publication details: Cambridge, United Kingdom : CaCambridge University Press, 2017.Description: xiii, 333 pages : illustrations ; 23 cmISBN:- 9781107514515
- 23 355.0217 Se23N
Item type | Current library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Books | Library and Documentation Division PGRRL | 355.0217 Se23N (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | 112498 |
Browsing Library and Documentation Division shelves, Shelving location: PGRRL Close shelf browser (Hides shelf browser)
No cover image available | No cover image available | |||||||
355.00954 M381M Matter of Honour : | 355.0217 C490G Getting nuclear weapons right: managing danger and avoiding disaster : | 355.0217 D351T Towards an effective chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) disaster management: a case study of Delhi / | 355.0217 Se23N Nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy | 355.02170954 M527S The strategy trap : | 355.031 N4201 The new power politics : | 355.031095694 H163W War against the people : |
Part I. The logic of nuclear skepticism. Nuclear blackmail in international politics --
Nuclear coercion and nuclear skepticism --
Part II. Trends. Standoffs : nuclear weapons in crisis bargaining --
Stalemates : territorial disputes and nuclear politics --
Part III. Cases. Brinkmanship busts : when nuclear coercion fails --
Think again : reassessing nuclear victories --
Part IV. Conclusions. Nuclear coercion in myth and reality --
Appendix : methods and data.
"Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? Since 1945, most strategic thinking about nuclear weapons has focused on deterrence--using nuclear threats to prevent attacks against the nation's territory and interests. But an often overlooked question is whether nuclear threats can also coerce adversaries to relinquish possessions or change their behavior. Can nuclear weapons be used to blackmail other countries? The prevailing wisdom is that nuclear weapons are useful for coercion, but this book shows that this view is badly misguided. Nuclear weapons are useful mainly for deterrence and self-defense, not for coercion. The authors evaluate the role of nuclear weapons in several foreign policy contexts and present a trove of new quantitative and historical evidence that nuclear weapons do not help countries achieve better results in coercive diplomacy. The evidence is clear: the benefits of possessing nuclear weapons are almost exclusively defensive, not offensive."--Page i.
There are no comments on this title.