Prof. G Ram Reddy Library

Nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy (Record no. 176014)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 02219 a2200241 4500
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field LDD
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20191226155549.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 191226b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 9781107514515
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Transcribing agency IGNOU Library
082 ## - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
Edition number 23
Classification number 355.0217 Se23N
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Sechser, Todd S
Relator term author
9 (RLIN) 9907
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy
Statement of responsibility, etc. Todd S Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Cambridge, United Kingdom :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. CaCambridge University Press,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. 2017.
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent xiii, 333 pages :
Other physical details illustrations ;
Dimensions 23 cm
505 ## - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note Part I. The logic of nuclear skepticism. Nuclear blackmail in international politics --<br/>Nuclear coercion and nuclear skepticism --<br/>Part II. Trends. Standoffs : nuclear weapons in crisis bargaining --<br/>Stalemates : territorial disputes and nuclear politics --<br/>Part III. Cases. Brinkmanship busts : when nuclear coercion fails --<br/>Think again : reassessing nuclear victories --<br/>Part IV. Conclusions. Nuclear coercion in myth and reality --<br/>Appendix : methods and data.
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. "Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? Since 1945, most strategic thinking about nuclear weapons has focused on deterrence--using nuclear threats to prevent attacks against the nation's territory and interests. But an often overlooked question is whether nuclear threats can also coerce adversaries to relinquish possessions or change their behavior. Can nuclear weapons be used to blackmail other countries? The prevailing wisdom is that nuclear weapons are useful for coercion, but this book shows that this view is badly misguided. Nuclear weapons are useful mainly for deterrence and self-defense, not for coercion. The authors evaluate the role of nuclear weapons in several foreign policy contexts and present a trove of new quantitative and historical evidence that nuclear weapons do not help countries achieve better results in coercive diplomacy. The evidence is clear: the benefits of possessing nuclear weapons are almost exclusively defensive, not offensive."--Page i.
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Nuclear warfare.
9 (RLIN) 3031
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Military policy.
9 (RLIN) 3031
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Diplomacy.
9 (RLIN) 9908
700 ## - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Fuhrmann, Matthew
Dates associated with a name 1980
Relator term author
9 (RLIN) 9909
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Source of classification or shelving scheme Dewey Decimal Classification
Koha item type Books
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Home library Current library Shelving location Date acquired Source of acquisition Cost, normal purchase price Total Checkouts Full call number Barcode Date last seen Cost, replacement price Price effective from Koha item type
No   Dewey Decimal Classification     Library and Documentation Division Library and Documentation Division PGRRL 03/15/2019 L&DD 1475.42   355.0217 Se23N 112498 03/15/2019 1844.28 03/15/2019 Books

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